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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 20010622-SC

vs.
MICHAEL SHAWN CASEY,

Priority No. 13

Defendant/Petitioner.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
* * *

STATEiMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in
State v. Casey, 2001 UT App 205, 29 P.3d 25 (reproduced in Addendum A). The Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The sole issue on certiorari is whether attempted murder under the intentional or
knowing alternative of the murder statute is a cognizable offense under Utah law.
Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision
for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, <]
8, 13 P.3d 576. Whether Utah recognizes an intentional or knowing attempted murder is a
matter of statutory interpretation reviewed for correctness. Cf. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843,

1

844 (Utah 1992) (holding that whether Utah recognizes attempted depraved indifference
homicide is a matter of statutory interpretation reviewed for correctness).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1999) is relevant to a determination
of this case. That section provides:
Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial
step toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them
to be.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and domestic
violence in the presence of a child. R. 34-35. Defendant was also charged with enhanced
penalties on each count for use of a dangerous weapon in the commission of the crimes. R.
34-35. After holding a preliminary hearing, a magistrate bound defendant over for trial. R.
230: 109-10. Following a two-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty on all three counts as
charged, including the enhanced penalties. R. 67, 70-71, 76-77, 112-14, 231-33. Defendant
was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of one-to- fifteen years for attempted murder and
7

zero-to-five years each for aggravated assault and domestic violence. R. 189-90. The court
also imposed a firearm enhancement penalty of one year on the murder conviction and zeroto-five years each on the aggravated assault and domestic violence convictions. R. 191.
Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that (1) the trial court improperly instructed the
jury on the mens rea element of attempted murder, and (2) the aggravated assault charge was
a lesser included offense ofthe murder charge. R. 142-44,168. After hearing argument, the
trial court denied the motion. R. 192-96.
Defendant appealed the trial court's rulings on his motion for a new trial, but the court
of appeals affirmed. Casey, 2001 UT App205. This Court granted defendant's petition for
certiorari review, which challenges only the court of appeals' holding that Utah recognizes
the crime of attempted murder under the "intentional or knowing" alternative of Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-203(l)(a) (1999). See Casey, 2001 UT App 205, at TJ 27.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

In April 1999, defendant threatened to kill Tresa Franz as he pointed a loaded gun at
her in a parked car; her four-year-old boy Quincy was sitting in the backseat. R. 232: 146-47,
195, 205.l The argument continued as defendant drove down a residential street. Again, he
pointed the gun at Franz's head, this time pulling the trigger. R. 232: 151, 206-07; see also
R. 233:315-16,322,363. Fortunately, the gun did not fire. R.232: 151, 153; R. 233: 316.
* * *

Only those facts that are relevant to the issues presented are included. The facts
are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d
337, 339 (Utah 1997).

Defendant and Franz were involved in a turbulent relationship, an on-again off-again
romance lasting several months. See R. 232: 139-40,165, 187-88; R. 233:462-66,473,48485. About a week after one of the couple's break-ups, defendant and his friend Terron Allred
drove to Franz's home where the three drank alcohol. R. 232: 135-37, 164-65, 170, 174-75,
238-39. Eventually, Allred, Franz, and Franz's four-year-old son Quincy left with defendant.
R. 232: 136, 170; R. 233: 309, 489, 497. After defendant ran an errand, he drove around
somemore, stopping at a liquor store to buy more alcohol. R. 232: 137-39, 170, 175-76; see
also R. 233: 492-93, 498, 501. Although Franz and Allred each had a swig of the rum,
defendant drank more than half. See R. 232: 137-38, 175-76; R. 233: 310, 400-01.
Intoxicated from the alcohol he had consumed that day, defendant became vulgar and
belligerent toward Franz. R. 232: 138-41, 167, 176. When she asked that he take her home,
defendant refused, laughing at her and threatening to kill her. R. 232: 140-41; R. 233: 492.
Instead, defendant drove to a friend's house and spoke with several people there while
Allred, Franz, and Quincy waited in the car. R. 232: 142-45, 170-72, 240-42, 247-48, 26061-63, 285-86; R. 233: 311-12, 340, 467-69, 503. When defendant returned to the car, he
told Allred to get out R. 232: 145, 176, 205, 263, 286; R. 233: 340, 496; see also R. 233:
471.
After Allred left the car, defendant and Franz began a heated argument. R. 232: 146,
248-49, 264, 286-87; R. 233: 472, 503. Before stepping into the car, defendant reached
behind the seat and pulled out a loaded handgun from his camera bag, keeping it concealed
from Franz's view. R. 232: 146, 177, 194; R. 233: 364. When Franz asked if he was ready
4

to go home, defendant declared, 4;F

you, bitch. I'm going to take you home all right"

R. 232: 146-47, 205. Defendant then took the gun and pointed it at Franz's neck. R. 232:
147, 195. Franz pleaded with defendant not to shoot her because her baby was in the car.
R. 232: 147. Hearing the argument and witnessing defendant point the gun at Franz, Tiffany
Ribe, who was talking with Allred, walked over to the car and told them they needed to
leave. R. 232: 147, 195, 249-54, 264, 266-70, 276, 279-80, 287. Allred got back in the car,
and after defendant put the gun down and agreed to go, Tiffany returned to the house. R.
232:149,251,254-55,267,271,276.
After Tiffany returned to the house, Franz fled into the house, only to return two or
three minutes later after realizing that her son was still in the car. R. 232: 149, 195, 254-55,
271, 288; R. 233: 314-15, 345, 474. After a brief pause in the argument, defendant again
threatened Franz and rebuked her efforts to appease him. See R. 232: 150-51, 255. At that
point, Tiffany's uncle emerged from the basement and told defendant to leave. See R. 232:
200,255-56,274; R. 233:347. Defendant apologized, backed out of the driveway, and drove
down the street. R. 232: 206, 256, 274, 289; R. 233: 347-48, 506.
Before reaching the end of the block, defendant again pointed the gun at Franz's face,
but this time pulled the trigger. R. 232: 151, 206-07; see also R. 233:315-16, 322, 363. The
gun misfired, failing to discharge. R. 232: 151, 153; R. 233: 316. Defendant then
successfully fired the gun at Franz's feet, but the bullet missed Franz and lodged in the
floorboard. R. 232: 153-54; R. 233: 323, 368, 402-03; see also R. 233: 511. Defendant
pushed the barrel of the gun up to Franz's head, but before he could pull the trigger, Franz
5

pushed defendant's arm into the air and jumped out of the moving truck. R. 232: 154, 20810, 212; R. 233: 389, 479-80; .see also R. 233: 324. As she jumped from the car, the gun
discharged a second time. R. 232: 154; R. 233: 317. During the altercation, at least three
shots were successfully fired, one of which accidentally hit defendant's hand. R. 233: 32325,352,367,512.
The gun used by defendant was later found, together with four shell casings and one
unspent round, in a hall way storage unit near Alfred's apartment. R. 233: 369-75,417, 419.
Testing revealed that the unspent round had misfired from defendant's gun and that all four
shell casings had been discharged from his gun. R. 233: 443-45.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the court of appeals erred in concluding that attempted murder
is a cognizable offense under the "intentional or knowing" alternative of the murder statute.
He contends that State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), effectively overruled State v.
Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982), which recognized that crime. Although Vigil rejected
one of the two rationales upon which Maestas relied in reaching its decision, it did not
overrule the ultimate holding—that Utah recognizes the crime of attempted murder under the
"intentional or knowing" alternative. Accordingly, Vigil noted that "Maestas is still good law
insofar as it authorizes prosecution for . . . attempted murder under the intentional or
knowing formulation" of the murder statute. Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848 n.5. Contrary to
defendant's claim, that statement does not constitute dicta, but appropriately limits the reach
of the Vigil holding. Because defendant has not challenged the second rationale upon which
6

the Maestas court relied, this Court has no alternative but to reject his claim and affirm the
decision of the court of appeals.
Moreover, when read according to the fair import of its terms, the murder statute treats
the "intentional" and "knowing" mental states under the first alternative theory of murder as
functional equivalents. A showing that a defendant knowingly caused the death of another
is the functional equivalent of a showing that defendant intentionally caused the death of
another. The attempt statute, as applied to the "intentional or knowing" alternative, should
be read similarly. Such an approach is consistent with the fair import of the statute's terms,
the Model Penal Code, and decisions of other courts.
Finally, even if the trial court erred in instructing the jury under the "intentional or
knowing" alternative, any such error is harmless. Defendant told Ms. Franz that he intended
to kill her. He pulled the trigger of a loaded gun while pointing it at her face. Fortunately,
it did not fire. He again pointed the gun at Ms. Franz's face, but she pushed his arm up into
the air before he pulled the trigger. In all, defendant successfully fired the gun at least three
times. Under these circumstances, the jury could not avoid finding that defendant intended
to kill Ms. Franz.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT UTAH
LAW RECOGNIZES THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED MURDER UNDER
THE "INTENTIONAL OR KiNOWING" ALTERNATIVE
On certiorari, defendant challenges the court of appeals' holding that an attempt to
commit murder under the "intentional or knowing" alternative of the murder statute does not
'

7

require a mental state greater than "knowing." Pet. Brf. at 7-15. Contrary to defendant's
claim, the court of appeals correctly decided the issue.
A.

VIGIL DID N O T O V E R R U L E

MAESTAS.

On certiorari, defendant contends that this Court's decision in State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d
843 (Utah 1992), is dispositive. Pet. Brf. at 7. His petition asserts that Vigil effectively
overruled this Court's decision in State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982), which held
that Utah law recognizes the offense of attempted murder under the "intentional or knowing"
alternative of the murder statute. See Pet. Brf. at 7-15. Defendant's claim is not supported
by the text of Vigil.
1.

Overview: State v. Maestas.

Like defendant here, Maestas argued that a stronger showing of intent than that
required for an "intentional or knowing" murder was necessary to sustain a conviction for
attempted murder. Maestas, 652 P.2d at 904.2 The Utah Supreme Court rejected that claim,
holding that Utah law recognizes the crime of attempted murder for "intentionally or
knowingly' attempting to cause the death of another. Id. at 904-05 (emphasis added).
Maestas argued that the attempt statute should be interpreted in a manner consistent
with the common law crime of attempted murder, which, he alleged, makes "intent [ ] a
necessary element of every 'attempt' crime even where the corresponding completed crime

2

Unlike defendant here, Maestas was charged with aggravated murder, which, like
the first alternative under the murder statute, requires a showing that the defendant
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another. See Maestas, 652 P.2d at 903-04;
compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1) (1999) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(a)
(1999).
8

does not require intent as an element." See id. at 904. The Court rejected this contention on
two grounds.
First, this Court observed that because Utah's criminal code has abolished all common
law crimes, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1999), it was not bound by the common law
interpretation of criminal offenses, but was at liberty to construe cnminal statutes "liberally[,]
even when they conflict with the common law." Maestas, 652 P.2d at 904. After so noting,
the Court turned to the language in subsection (1) requiring a showing that the defendant
"act[ ] with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense/'
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1). The court concluded that section 76-1 -401 does not impose
intent as an element of every attempt, but "requires only 'the kind of culpability,'" meaning
mental state, '"otherwise required for the commission of the [completed] offense.'" Maestas,
652 P.2d at 904 {quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1)) (brackets in original).
As a second basis for its decision, the Court turned to an analysis of the common law.
The Court concluded that even if the common law rule of attempt governed the Court's
interpretation of the statute, it "would not require the result urged by defendant." Id. at 905.
The Court explained:
Th[e] rule [that intent is a necessary element of every attempt] differentiates
between the intent requirements for an attempted and a completed crime only
where the completed crime may be committed without the intent to commit that
crime in particular, as in the case of felony murder. Where an intent to
commit the particular crime is an element of the completed crime, the same
intent requirement applies to the corresponding 'attempt' crime, even at
common law. Thus, Utah's first degree murder statute, which does contain
such an intent requirement, would not fall within the rule cited by defendant
even under common law principles.
9

Id. (emphasis added).
2.

Overview: State v. Vigil.

Ten years later in Vigil, this Court re-examined Utah's attempt statute, focusing on the
effect of subsection (2), which provides that "conduct does not constitute a substantial step
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-4-101 (2). The Court concluded that subsection (2) "limit[s] the attempt statute to
offenses with a mental state of 'intent.'" Id. at 846. The Court reasoned that, contrary to its
decision in Maestas, the "culpability" referred to in subsection (1) refers not to the actor's
mental state, but "to the attendant circumstances, if any, of the underlying offense." Vigil,
842 P.2d at 845-46. Thus, Vigil rejected the first of the two rationales upon which the
Maestas decision rested, holding that it was "incorrect" and "inconsistent" with its decisions
in Vigil and other cases. Id. at 848 n.5.3
Nevertheless, the Vigil court left undisturbed the central holding of Maestas—that
Utah law recognizes the crime of attempted murder under the "intentional or knowing"

:

The Vigil court opined that the "culpability" rationale relied on in Maestas
conflicted with its decisions refusing to recognize attempted reckless manslaughter and
attempted murder under the felony murder alternative. Vigil, 842 P.2d at 847-48 & n.5;
see State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 1989) (holding that "[t]he crime of attempted
murder does not fit within the felony-murder doctrine because an attempt to commit a
crime requires proof of an intent to consummate the crime"); State v. Norman, 580 P.2d
237, 239 (Utah 1978) (holding that an attempt under reckless manslaughter is not
cognizable because that alternative simply requires the mental state of recklessness,
whereas ;i[a]n attempt to commit a crime is an act done with the intent to commit that
crime"); see also State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 1982) (recognizing the crime of
attempted manslaughter under the imperfect legal justification alternative because the
killing must be intentional).
10

alternative of the murder statute. Id. at 848 n.5. Although it rejected Maestas 's culpability
rationale, the Vigil court expressly "note[d] that Maestas is still good law insofar as it
authorizes prosecution for attempted aggravated murder under the intentional or knowing
formulation of section 76-5-202(1) or attempted murder under the intentional or knowing
formulation of section 76-5-203(1 )(a)." Id (emphasis added).
3.

Vigil Left Undisturbed the Holding in Maestas.

Vigil's footnote reaffirming Maestas's holding as to an attempted murder requiring
a mental state of "intentional or knowing" is, according to defendant, mere dicta. Pet. Brf.
at 14-15. To the contrary, that footnote serves to limit the scope of the Court's holding to the
propriety of applying the attempt statute to the depraved indifference alternative of the
murder statute. In other words, although its underlying rationale undercut one of the two
rationales relied on in Maestas, Vigil does not purport to address the ultimate holding in
Maestas—that attempted murder under the intentional or knowing alternative is a cognizable
offense in Utah. As the court of appeals properly concluded below, Casey, 2001 UT App
205, at ^J14, the Vigil decision was expressly limited to the "narrow" issue of "whether proof
of the 'knowing' mental state required for depraved indifference homicide under section 765-203(1 )(c) of the Code is sufficient to satisfy the mental state required by Utah's attempt
statute found in section 76-4-101." Vigil, 842 P.2d at 844 (emphasis added). Vigil held that
it is not, concluding that "the crime of attempted depraved indifference homicide does not
exist in Utah." Id. at 844-48. Vigil reaches no further.

11

As the court of appeals below observed, "[i]f the [Vigil] court intended to eliminate
attempted 'knowing' murders under the 'intentional or knowing' alternative, instead of
writing that 'Maestas is still good law insofar as it authorizes prosecution for . . . attempted
murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of section 76-5-203(1 )(a),' the [Vigil]
court could have simply written that Maestas is still good law insofar as it authorizes
attempted 'intentional' murders under section 76-5-203(l)(a)." Casey, 2001 UT App 205,
at ^f 14 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).

Because Vigil did not overrule Maestas, defendant's claim on certiorari must fail.
Defendant has not challenged the second rationale upon which the Maestas court relied,
either on direct appeal or on certiorari. Having failed to do so, this Court has no alternative
but to reject his claim and affirm the decision of the court of appeals. See Coulter & Smith,
Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998) (holding that review on certiorari is limited
by the issues raised in the petition).
B.

THE MURDER STATUTE TREATS
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENTS.

"INTENTIONAL"

AND "KNOWING"

AS

Even if this Court were to re-visit the ultimate holding in Maestas, Utah's attempt
statute as applied to the "intentional or knowing" alternative of the murder statute is fairly
read to recognize the crime of attempted murder for attempting to "intentionally or
knowingly" cause the death of another. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1999) (providing
that criminal statutes are not to be strictly construed, but "according to the fair import of their
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terms to promotejustice and to effect the objects of the law — " ) ; accord Maestas, 652 P.2d
at 904 (observing that criminal statutes are to be construed liberally).
An understanding of the attempt statute, as applied to the murder statute, first requires
an understanding of the murder statute itself. Under section 76-5-203, a person who causes
the death of another is guilty of murder if he or she does so:
(1) "intentionally or knowingly;"
(2) "intending to cause serious bodily injury to another" while acting in
a manner "clearly dangerous to human life;"
(3) "under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human
life" and his or her conduct "creates a grave risk of death to another;"
(4) "while in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight
from the commission or attempted commission o f certain enumerated
felonies; or
(5) "recklessly" while assaulting a peace officer or forcefully interfering
with a peace officer making a lawful arrest or in an attempt thereof and the
peace officer dies.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (1999).4 The legislature has thus demarcated five alternative
theories of murder, distinguished by separate mental states of varying degree dependent upon
the circumstances surrounding the homicide. Reckless murder of an officer requires a
showing that the perpetrator acted recklessly. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(e); State
v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1350-51 (Utah 1997). Felony murder only requires proof of the

4

The murder statute lists two other circumstances constituting murder, but each is
simply a reduction from aggravated murder based on specified conditions. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(0 (reducing aggravated murder where an enumerated
affirmative defense is shown) & § 76-5-203( l)(g) (reducing aggravated murder where
special mitigation is established).
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mens rea associated with the underlying felony; no mental state is required as to the homicide
itself. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(d); State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, H 25, 438 Utah
Adv. Rep 39. Depraved indifference murder requires a showing that the perpetrator "knew
his or her conduct created a grave risk of death to another." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5203(1 )(c); Vigil, 842 P.2d at 844. Serious bodily injury murder requires a showing that the
perpetrator intended to cause serious bodily injury in committing an act that was clearly
dangerous to human life. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(b). Finally, intentional murder
requires a showing that the perpetrator acted intentionally or knowingly. See Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-203(l)(a).
In Vigil, the State argued that because each of the murder alternatives was subject to
the same punishment, the mental states of each should be treated as equivalent to the "intent"
required under the attempt statute. See Vigil, 842 P.2d at 847. The Court rejected the State's
argument, concluding that the lesser mental states identified in the other murder alternatives
could not be read to mean purposeful intent. Id. This proposition may be true as to the
mental states corresponding to the five alternative theories of murder. However, it does not
hold true in the case of the first alternative theory of murder which recognizes murder for
"intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] the death of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5203(l)(a).
As noted, the legislature separated murder intofivealternative theories—distinguished
by the differing mental states and the attendant circumstances. However, it made no
distinction between knowingly causing death and intentionally causing death, choosing
14

instead to group those two mental states together under a single alternative. In other words,
the two mental states are, for purposes of the statute, functionally equivalent.
To hold otherwise, the Court would be required to in effect rewrite the statute,
creating a sixth alternative theory of murder: one for "knowingly" causing death and another
for "intentionally" causing death. Had the legislature intended such a result, it would have
written the statute accordingly. Instead, it chose to treat these two mental states as functional
equivalents by grouping them together under one alternative theory of murder.
That the legislature intended to treat these two mental states as functional equivalents
under the murder statute is evidenced by its approach to aggravated murder—"one of the
most heinous acts known to society." State v. Holland, 111 P.2d 1019, 1028 (Utah 1989).
Aggravated murder subjects the guilty to death, the ultimate and most severe of all
punishments. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(2) (1999). Accordingly, persons guilty of
murder under the latter four alternatives of the murder statute, e.g., serious bodily injury
murder, depraved indifference murder, felony murder, and reckless murder of an officer, are
not subject to prosecution for aggravated murder even if the aggravating circumstances
identified in the aggravated murder statute are present. Only those who "intentionally or
knowingly cause[] the death of another"—the first alternative theory of murder, are subject
to prosecution for aggravated murder if the aggravators are present. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5202(1). Again, the legislature chose to group the two mental states together, rather than
treating them separately—even where a defendant's life may be at stake.
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Likewise, this Court has consistently treated a showing that the defendant
"intentionally or knowingly" caused the death of another as an "intentional murder." For
example, in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 569 (Utah 1987), this Court noted that the
aggravated murder statute "explicitly requires that the actor intentionally or knowingly cause
the death of another under any of several circumstances." However, immediately after
making this observation, the Tillman court reiterated that "[n]o unintentional, negligent, or
accidental killing, regardless of the circumstances, can be [aggravated] murder." Tillman,
750 P.2d at 569 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). In other words, Tillman makes clear that
under the murder and aggravated murder statutes, knowingly causing the death of another
is the functional equivalent of intentionally causing the death of another. Other decisions of
this Court have also treated a knowing murder as the functional equivalent of an intentional
murder. See, e.g., State v. Herrerra, 895 P.2d 359,377 (Utah 1995) (referring to aggravated
murder and murder under the "intentional or knowing" alternative as "intentional murder");
State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629,658 (Utah 1995) (observing that the aggravating circumstances
identified in the aggravated murder statute "serve to distinguish those intentional murders
that qualify for capital punishment from those that do not"); Holland, 111 P.2d at 1028
(referring to capital homicide as an "intentional murder").
Where the murder statute treats these two mental states as functional equivalents, so
too must the attempt statute. This reading of the attempt statute is consistent with the Model
Penal Code (MPC). This Court has observed that Utah's attempt statute "adopts the
definition of an 'attempt' employed in the Model Penal Code, §§ 5.01, purposed on drawing
16

the line further away from the final act and enlarging the common law concept." State v.
Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1984) (per curiam).

As observed in Vigil, the

commentaries to the MPC provide that the "attempt provision requires either intentional
conduct or the belief that the actor's conduct will result in the proscribed act." Vigil, 842
P.2d at (Utah 1992) (citing 1 Amer.L.Inst., Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 5.01,303
(1985)) (emphasis added). Therefore, the recognition of the crime of attempted murder for
an intentional or knowing attempt to cause the death of another is consistent with the Model
Penal Code after which section 76-4-101 was fashioned.^ Thus, contrary to defendant's
claim on certiorari, see Pet. Brf. at 10-11, Vigil appears to have adopted the MPC approach
inasmuch as it expressly refused to overrule the holding in Maestas.
In holding that attempted murder "can be knowingly committed," the Anzona Court
of Appeals observed that while "the drafters of the Model Penal Code agreed that there
should be no attempt crime for negligent or reckless homicide[,] [t]he Code goes on to state:
"When, on the other hand, a person actually believes that his behavior will
produce the proscribed result, it is appropriate to treat him as attempting to
cause the result, whether or not that is his purpose.
Subsection (l)(b) provides that when causing a particular result is an element
of the crime, as in homicide offenses . . ., an actor commits an attempt when
he does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing cor with the belief
that it will cause' such result without further conduct on his part. Thus, a

'But see Vigil, 842 P.2d at 846-47 (citing Loren Martin, Utah Criminal Code
Outline 169 (1973)), which notes that the Utah attempt statute was also modeled after the
1971 Proposed Federal Criminal Code, and citing 1 National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws 354 & n.6, which states that the attempt provision requires
intentional conduct).
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belief that death will ensue from the actor's conduct. . . will suffice, as well
as would a purpose to bring about those results. If, for example, the actor's
purpose were to demolish a building and, knowing that persons were in the
building and that they would be killed by the explosion, he nevertheless
detonated a bomb that turned out to be defective, he could be prosecuted for
attempted murder even though it was no part of his purpose that the inhabitants
of the building would be killed."
State v. Nunez, 769 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (An. App. 1989) {citing Model Penal Code §§
5.01.2, at 301 (1985)).
Accordingly, a fair and common sense reading of the attempt and murder statutes
leads to the conclusion that in grouping together under one alternative the acts of knowingly
causing death and intentionally causing death, the legislature intended to create a statutory
inference of intent upon proof that the defendant knowingly caused the death of another.
This construction of the attempt statute is consistent with pronouncements of this Court,
before and after Vigil. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 642 (Utah 1997)
(comparing the penalty for aggravated assault by a prisoner with that for "attempted murder,
which also requires an intent to kill or a knowledge that one's acts would result in death if
earned out"); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1157 (Utah 1991) (upholding attempted
murder conviction because "[t]he jury could certainly [have] inferred] from [defendant's]
statements . . . that [defendant] administered the [poison] with the necessary intent or
knowledge"); State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1986) (holding that in order to
convict defendant, "the State must have adduced evidence that would have allowed the jury
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally or knowingly attempted to
cause [the victim's] death"). It is also consistent with decisions in other states. See, e.g.,
18

Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ind. 1999) (observing that "[t]o sustain an attempted
murder conviction, the State must prove that the defendant took a substantial step towards
the intentional or knowing killing of another); People v. Gonzalez, 926 P.2d 153, 155 (Colo.
App. 1996) (holding that "attempted second degree murder requires an awareness that death
is practically certain to result"); Gentry v. State, 881 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. App. 1994)
(holding that "[t]o convict appellant of attempted murder, the State had to prove that
appellant intentionally or knowingly intended to cause the death of the complainant"); Nunez,
769 P.2d at 1042-43 ("concluding] that attempted first degree murder can be knowingly
committed"); Free v. State, 455 So.2d 137, 147 (Ala. App. 1984) (observing that
"[attempted murder is a specific intent crime" and therefore "[o]ne must intentionally or
knowingly attempt to commit murder"); State v. Feliciano, 618 P.2d 306, 308 (Haw. 1980)
(holding that "[attempted murder is established when a defendant intentionally or knowingly
attempted to cause the death of another through an act which is a substantial step in the
course of conduct intended to culminate in the crime of murder").6 As such, the court of
appeals correctly held that Utah law recognizes the crime of attempted murder under the
"intentional or knowing" alternative of the murder statute.

6

Defendant has cited to several jurisdictions reaching the opposite conclusion. See
Pet. Brf. at 11-12. However, not all those cited by defendant necessarily preclude an
attempt under the "knowing" mental state since some indicate that specific intent includes
knowing. See, e.g., Bartlett, 711 N.E.2d at 499 (Ind. 1999); Free, 455 So.2d at 147 (Ala.
App. 1984)
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C

ANY ERROR IN THE INSTRUCTION IS HARMLESS,

Even if this Court were to find that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on an
"intentional or knowing" attempted murder, any such error would be harmless.
1.

Effect of Improper Instructions.

Because the State bears the burden of proving the elements of an offense, the trial
court must properly instruct the jury on the elements. See State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222
(Utah 1986); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1999). As a general rule, therefore, "[a]n
accurate instruction upon the basic elements of the offense charged is essential, and the
failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error." State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah
1980). However, an exception to this general rule exists where the error is shown not to be
substantial.
While an instruction may be incomplete or incorrect, the reviewing court can
determine that the jury did find each of the elements of the offense and therefore any error
is not prejudicial. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048-1049 (Utah 1984) (reviewing
failure to expressly treat element of knowledge in context of second degree murder
conviction). In Fontana, this Court held that even the failure to define the mental state
necessary for the offense may be harmless. Id. at 1048. Fontana was convicted of seconddegree murder for shooting a fellow driver in the head while driving along a Salt Lake City
street. Id. at 1043. He argued on appeal that the jury instruction on "depraved indifference"
required reversal because it made no reference to mental state. Id. 1044-45. This Court held
that the applicable mental state was "knowingly, meaning 'aware of the nature of his conduct
20

or the existing circumstances .. "Id. at 1046 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2)). The
elements instruction mentioned no mental state. Id.
In finding no prejudice, the Court found that "[i]n the context of the other instructions
and the evidence in this case, the jury could hardly have misunderstood that the defendant
had to be aware that his conduct created a grave risk of death to another, as described in the
statutory definitions contained in the instructions." Id. at 1048. "Moreover," the Court
continued, "the jury could not have avoided finding that the defendant, an experienced
marksman, was in fact aware of the grave risk of death to another posed by his discharging
a .357 Magnum pistol in the circumstances described in the evidence." Id. In light of
"[tjhese realities, in company with the fact that the defense made no request for an instruction
on the defendant's knowledge or awareness of the grave risk of death posed by his conduct,"
the Court concluded "that any error in the omission of an express instruction on the element
of knowledge was not prejudicial in this case." Id.
Thus, where a reviewing court cannot determine whether the jury found all the
elements of the offense, see State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991), or where the
omitted element was at issue, see Laine, 618 P.2d at 35, a reviewing court cannot determine
whether the jury found that element, and reversal is required. However, where the reviewing
court can determine that the jury found all the elements of the offense, no prejudice—and
therefore no manifest injustice—has occurred; this is especially so where the defendant did
not object to the instruction assailed on appeal. See Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1098.
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2.

The Jury Could Not Avoid Finding Intent.

Under the facts of this case, any error in instructing the jury on attempted murder
based on the "intentional or knowing'' murder alternative is harmless. Intent is seldom
proved by direct evidence, but is "inferred from the actions of the defendant or from
surrounding circumstances." State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 1983). In this
case, defendant's actions demonstrated an unmistakable intent to cause Franz's death.
During the argument that precipitated the shooting, defendant announced his intention
to kill Franz, declaring, "F

you, bitch. I'Hf

ing kill you " R. 232: 141. He then

pointed the loaded gun at Franz's neck, but stopped short of pulling the trigger when Tiffany
Ribe intervened. See R. 232: 147, 195, 249-54, 264, 266-70, 276, 279-80, 287. Almost
immediately after they drove away from the house, defendant again pointed the gun directly
at Franz's face, but this time pulled the trigger. R. 232: 151, 206-07; see also R. 233: 31516,322,363. The gun misfired, failing to discharge. R. 232: 151-53; R. 233: 316; see also
R. 233: 443-45. When the gun misfired, defendant continued in his attempts. He once again
put the gun to Franz's face, but before he could pull the trigger, Franz pushed defendant's
arm into the air and jumped out of the moving truck. R. 232: 152, 208-10, 212; R. 233: 389,
479-80. As she jumped from the car, the gun discharged. R. 232: 154; R. 233: 317. In all,
defendant successfully fired the gun at least three times. R. 233: 323-25, 352, 367, 512.
Under these circumstances, "the jury could not have avoided finding" that it was in
fact defendant's conscious objective or desire to kill Franz. See Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1048;

n

see also Dumas, 721 P.2d at 504-05 (evidence showed intent to kill where defendant
threatened to kill the victim and took steps to accomplish that purpose).7
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the
decision of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted this ZZ> day of February, 2002.
MARK SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

^
:

REY S. GRAY
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY Q$tf ERAL
Attorneys for Respondent

Defendant has not argued that he did not take a substantial step toward the
commission of the attempted murder. Indeed, the act of pointing the gun at the victim
and pulling the trigger, though a misfire, constitutes a substantial step. See People v.
Files, 632 N.E.2d 1087, 1096 (111. App. 1994); State v. Turner, 587 A.2d 1050, 1053
(Conn. App.), cert, denied, 591 A.2d 812 (Conn. 1991).
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BILLINGS, Judge:
Hi
Defendant Michael Shawn Casey appeals his convictions of
attempted murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203(1) (a) and 76-4-101 (1999), and aggravated
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103 (1999).l Defendant argues he was improperly convicted
of attempted murder because the jury was not instructed that
attempted murder requires the "intent" to cause a death. He also
argues he was improperly convicted of aggravated assault and
attempted murder because the offenses were based on the same
conduct. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
<|2
"'We view the facts in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict and recite them accordingly.'" State v. Lopez, 2001 UT
1. Defendant was also convicted of domestic violence in the
presence of a child, a third degree felony, in violation of Utar
Code Ann. § 76-5-109.1 (1999), and received enhanced penalties
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1999), for use of a dangerous
weapon. He does not appeal the conviction or the enhancements.

App 123,12, 419 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (citation omitted). In early
1999, Defendant was romantically involved with Tresa Franz
(Franz). After drinking alcohol with Terron Allred (Allred) and
Franz, Defendant drove Allred, Franz, and Franz's son around.
They eventually stopped to purchase a pint of rum. Defendant
drank most of the pint and became intoxicated and belligerent
towards Franz. Franz asked Defendant to take her home, but he
instead threatened to kill her and drove to a friend's house. At
the house, Allred left the car to speak with the friend.
Defendant and Franz began arguing, and Franz asked if he was
ready to go home. Defendant responded, "Fuck you, bitch. I'm
going to take you home all right," and pointed a handgun at
Franz's neck.
f3
Seeing Defendant point the gun at Franz, the friend told
them to leave. Defendant put the gun down and agreed to leave.
As Allred returned to the car, Franz fled into the house.
However, she returned a few minutes later because she realized
her son was not with her. After Franz returned, Defendant began
arguing with her and threatened her again. Hearing the argument,
the friend's uncle emerged from the house and told them to leave.
Defendant apologized, backed out of the driveway, and drove away.
if4 Before they reached the end of the block, Defendant pointed
the gun at Franz's face and pulled the trigger, but the gun
misfired. Defendant then shot at Franz's feet, but missed, the
bullet lodging in the floorboard. Defendant then pushed the gun
barrel to Franz's head, but before he could pull the trigger, ••
Franz pushed his arm in the air and jumped from the car. As she
jumped, the gun discharged again. During the ^Ltercation, three
shots were successfully fired.
^5
Defendant was charged with attempted murder, aggravated
assault, domestic violence in the presence of a child, and
enhanced penalties on each count for using a dangerous weapon.
The jury convicted Defendant on all counts. Prior to sentencing,
Defendant's counsel withdrew. Subsequently, appointed counsel
filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court
improperly instructed the jury on the mens rea required for
attempted murder and that the aggravated assault was a lesser
included offense of the attempted murder. Following a hearing,
the trial court denied Defendant's motion. Defendant filed this
appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
16
This appeal presents issues of statutory interpretation.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law;
"[t]herefore, we review the trial court's ruling[s] for
correctness and give no deference to its conclusions." State v.
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Viail. 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992); see also State v. Kepoler,
1999 UT App 89,^4, 976 P.2d 99. 2

ANALYSIS
I.

Was Defendant Properly Convicted of Attempting to
"Intentionally or Knowingly" Cause Franz's Death?

f7
Defendant argues that Utah's Criminal Code requires the
State to prove that he had the "intent" to cause Franz's death.
Therefore, he argues the jury was improperly instructed that the
required mental state was "intentionally or knowingly" and his
conviction must be reversed.
^8

The attempt statute provides:
(1)

(2)

[A] person is guilty of an attempt to
commit a crime if, acting with the kind
of culpability otherwise required for
the commission of the offense, he [or
she] engages in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward commission of
the offense.
[C]onduct does not constitute a
substantial step unless it is strongly
corroborative of the actor's intent to
commit the offense.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999). Defendant wa^ charged with
attempted murder under section 76-5-203(1)(a) of the murder
statute (the "intentional or knowing" alternative). This section

2. The State does not argue that we should not consider the mens
rea or lesser included offense issues because they were not
preserved for appeal. However, Defendant did not raise these
issues until his motion for a new trial. Ordinarily the failure
to timely raise an issue waives that issue. See Utah R. Crim. P.
12(d). However, when a trial court considers the merits of an
issue raised in a motion for a new trial, the issue is preserved
for appeal. See State v. Seale. 353 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993)
(concluding objection to admission of videotape due to failure to
comply with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411 was preserved for appeal
because trial court addressed merits); State v. Lucero. 866 P.2d
1, 2 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (concluding objection to
supplemental jury instruction was preserved for appeal because
trial court considered and ruled on merits). Although Defendant
did not raise either issue until his motion for a new trial, the
trial court considered and ruled on the merits of these issues.
Therefore, we conclude the issues were preserved for appeal.

20000122-CA
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provides: "Criminal homicide constitutes murder if [a defendant]
. . . intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) (1999).
19
Both parties rely on State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah
1982) and State v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992). Construing
the attempt and murder statutes in Maestas, the Utah Supreme
Court rejected a claim that an attempt to commit first degree
murder3 requires a mental state greater than "knowing." See
Maestas, 652 P.2d at 904-05. The court offered two rationales
for its. decision. First, the court interpreted paragraph one of
the attempt statute to require "only the kind of culpability
otherwise required for the commission of the [completed]
offense." Id. at 904 (alteration in original) (quotations
omitted). Accordingly, the court concluded that "there [is] no
difference between the intent required as an element of the crime
of attempted first degree murder and that required for first
degree murder." Id. Alternatively, the court explained, even if
the common law governed, the "intentional or knowing" mental
state required for first degree murder was sufficient under the
common law. See id. at 905.
1l0 Significantly, the jury instructions in Maestas were similar
to the jury instructions in the present case. They ^described
the elements of attempted first degree murder and defined the
terms 'intentionally' and 'knowingly' in precisely the language
used by the Utah Criminal Code." Id. at 907 (citing Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-103(1)-(2) (1953)). The Maestas court specifically
noted that the jury "received proper instruction[s] concerning
the act and intent requirements for the crime oharged." Id.
flll Subsequently, in Vigil, the Utah Supreme Court held that
attempted murder under the depraved indifference murder
alternative in section 76-5-203(1) (c)4 is not a crime. See

3. In 1991 the Legislature changed "first degree murder" to
"aggravated murder" and "second degree murder" to "murder." Act
of 1991, ch. 10, §§ 8-9, 1991 Utah Laws 74, 78-79 (codified as
amended Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202 to -203 (1999)). The
"intentional or knowing" mental states required for aggravated
murder in section 76-5-202(1) and murder in section 76-5-203
(1)(a) are identical. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1160
n.6 (Utah 1991). Aggravated murder requires aggravating
circumstances to accompany the mental state. See id. at 1156.
4. "Criminal homicide constitutes murder if [the defendant]
. . . acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of
(continued...)
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Vigil, 842 P.2d at 843-44. The court first noted the mental
state required to support a depraved indifference murder
conviction is "knowledge" that conduct "created a grave risk of
death to another." Id. at 844. The court then rejected the
Maestas court's interpretation of paragraph one of the attempt
statute. Paragraph one provides that an attempt occurs when a
defendant "acts with the 'kind of culpability otherwise
required'" for the underlying offense. Id. at 845 (quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1)). The court construed that language "to
refer to the attendant circumstances, if any, of the underlying
offense." Id. at 845-46 (footnote omitted).
fl2 The court then construed paragraph two of the attempt
statute. Paragraph two provides that "the defendant's conduct
must be corroborative of his or her 'intent to commit the
offense.'" Id. at 845 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(2)).
The court concluded paragraph two limits attempts to offenses
with the mental state of "intent," as defined by section 76-2103(1). See id. at 847. Section 76-2-103(1) defines "intent" as
"'conscious objective or desire.'" Id. (emphasis and citation
omitted). Accordingly, the court held:
fTlo convict a defendant of attempted second
degree murder, the prosecution must prove
that the defendant had a conscious objective
or desire to cause the death of another.
Because the mental state required for
depraved indifference homicide falls short of
that intent, the crime of attempted depraved
indifference homicide does not exist in Utah.
Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
1l3 Although in Vigil the court overruled Maestas in part, the
court explicitly refused to completely overrule Maestas and
approved the second rationale articulated in Maestas..
The first alternative rationale relied on in
Maestas is clearly inconsistent with . . .
rstate v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989),
State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), and
State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978)]
and with our holding in the instant case.
Thus, that portion of Maestas . . . is
incorrect. However, we note that Maestas is
still good law insofar as it authorizes
prosecution for attempted aggravated murder

4. (...continued)
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (c) (1999).
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under the intentional or knowing formulation
of section 76-5-202(1) or attempted murder
under the intentional or knowing formulation
of section 76-5-203(1)(a).
Id. at 848 n.5. (emphasis added). Thus, Vigil explicitly allows
a conviction for a "knowing" mental state under 76-5-203(1) (a),
which is the section under which Defendant was convicted.
1Jl4 Defendant argues that following Vigil, attempted murder
requires the "intent" to cause a death, therefore, the "knowing"
state of mind in the "intentional or knowing" alternative is
insufficient. We disagree. The court noted, "The issue before
us is narrow [,] . . . to determine whether . . . the 'knowing'
mental state required for depraved indifference homicide under
section 76-5-203(1) (c) . . . is sufficient to satisfy the mental
state required by Utah's attempt statute." Id. at 844. If the
court intended to eliminate attempted "knowing" murders under the
"intentional or knowing" alternative, instead of writing that
"Maestas is still good law insofar as it authorizes prosecution
for . . . attempted murder under the intentional or knowing
formulation of section 76-5-203(1) (a)," id. at 848 n.5 (emphasis
added), the court could have simply written that Maestas is still
good law insofar as it authorizes attempted "intentional" murders
under section 76-5-203 (1) (a) ,5
II.

Was Defendant Properly Convicted of Aggravated
Assault and Attempted Murder?

Kl5 Defendant argues that the aggravated assauit and attempted
murder should not have been charged as two separate offenses
because they were one offense in the same criminal episode and
because the aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of
the attempted murder. Under section 76-1-402(1):

5. Following Vigil, Utah appellate courts have stated without
analysis that the mental state required for an attempted murder
conviction under the "intentional or knowing" alternative is
"intent" to cause a death or "knowledge that one's acts would
result in death if carried out" State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630,
642 (Utah 1997) (plurality opinion!, or knowledge that "conduct
[is] reasonably certain to cause [a] death." State v. White, 880
P.2d 18, 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also State v. Lemons, 844
P.2d 378, 381 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (noting required mental
state is "intent" or "knowledge"); cf. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d
1150, 1156 (Utah 1991) (noting prior to Vigil mental state
required is "intent" or "knowledge"); State v. Castonauav, 663
P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1983) (same).
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A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode;
however, when the same act of a defendant
under a single criminal episode shall
establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of
this code, the act shall be punishable under
only one such provision . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1999).
116 The clear intent of this section 'is that "[a] defendant may
not be punished twice for [the same] act." State v. O'Brien, 721
P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1986). Thus, we must determine if the
conduct supporting the aggravated assault and attempted murder
were the "same act." See State v. Mane, 733 P.2d 61, 63 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) .
117 Utah appellate courts have concluded acts are independent if
they are in no way necessary to each other or sufficiently
separated by time and place. See State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233,
1239 (Utah 1989) (concluding forcible sexual abuse and forcible
sodomy supported two counts of aggravated sexual assault because
they were in no way necessary to each other); 0' Brien, 721 P.2d
at 897, 900 (concluding defendants who broke into cabin, then
later pointed guns at owners, threatened to shoot them, held them
at gun point for several hours, took money from them, and then**
kidnaped them, were properly sentenced for aggravated burglary,
aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnaping b^ause the crimes
were the result of separate and distinct acts); State v. Porter,
705 P. 2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) (concluding defendant committed
two separately punishable burglaries when he broke into an
apartment within twenty minutes of breaking into a laundry room
in the same "apartment house").
118 We conclude the aggravated assault and attempted murder were
not necessary to each other and were separated by time, place,
and intervening circumstances. The aggravated assault occurred
in the driveway. Defendant stated, "Fuck you, bitch. I'm going
to take you home all right," then pointed a gun at Franz's neck.
Seeing Defendant point the gun at Franz, the friend told him to
leave and he put the gun down. Franz then fled the car into the
house. Clearly, the assault was complete at this point.
119 Following the assault, Franz remained in the house for a few
minutes. Franz then returned to the car, and Defendant began
arguing with her again. The friend's uncle emerged from the
house and told them to leave. Defendant then backed the car out
of the driveway. As Defendant drove down the street, he
committed the separate act of attempting to murder Franz by
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pointing a gun at her head and pulling the trigger.
at her feet and pushed the gun barrel to her head.

He then shot

1|20 Clearly, the aggravated assault and attempted murder were in
no way necessary to each other and were separated by time, place,
and intervening circumstances. Thus, we conclude section 76-1402(1) does not bar Defendant's conviction of both offenses.
H21 Defendant next argues that the statutory elements, jury
instructions, and evidence establish that the aggravated assault
was a lesser included offense of the attempted murder. He
therefore argues he was improperly convicted of both offenses
under section 76-1-402(3):
A defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in the offense charged but may not
be convicted of both the offense charged and
the included offense. An offense is so
included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999) (emphasis added).
122 The State concedes, and we assume without deciding, that
Defendant's conduct while driving involved an aggravated assault
which merged into an attempted murder. However, the issue in
this case is not whether Defendant was improperly convicted of a
lesser included offense based on his conduct while driving.
Rather, the issue is whether the assault on Franz in the driveway
followed by the attempted murder while driving down the street
were separately proved at trial.
<!23 In State v. Betha. 957 P. 2d 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this
court considered whether aggravated assault was a lesser included
offense of aggravated burglary. See id. at 617. The evidence
demonstrated three separate assaults had occurred, two in the
victim's house and one in the defendant's car. See id. at 619.
We noted, "While it is true that [the] defendant twice assaulted
[the victim] during the aggravated burglary, he assaulted her a
third time after he left the scene of the burglary and was in the
act of committing aggravated kidnaping." Id. Therefore, we
concluded, "[T] he elements of aggravated assault were established
by proof of more than 'all the facts required to establish' the
aggravated burglary." Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1402(3)(a) (1995)). We then considered "whether the jury was
properly instructed to find this additional proof." Id. We
concluded that because the jury was instructed that it had to
find an additional element to convict the defendant of aggravated
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assault, that the defendant intentionally caused serious bodily
injury, under the facts of the case, aggravated assault was not a
lesser included offense of aggravated burglary. See id.
1124 Unlike Betha, the aggravated assault in the present case has
the same elements as the attempted murder, but was based on
different facts. However, Betha counsels that a jury must be
instructed appropriately so it does not convict a defendant twice
on the same facts. See id. To uphold Defendant's conviction, we
must find that a reasonable jury would have understood that based
on the instructions, arguments, and evidence at trial, it could
not convict Defendant of aggravated assault and attempted murder
based only on the acts in the driveway or only on the acts
committed while driving down the street. Cf. State v. Ross, 951
P.2d 236, 245 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
125 Defendant argues the jury was not instructed that it could
not convict Defendant of aggravated assaulted and attempted
murder based on the conduct while driving. However, the jury was
instructed that "[a] separate crime or offense is charged in each
count of the information. Each charge and the evidence
pertaining to it should be considered separately."
(Emphasis
added.)
126 Arguably this instruction sufficiently instructed the jury
that it could not convict Defendant of aggravated assault and
attempted murder based on the same evidence.6 Moreover, there.is

6. The State's arguments make it clear that th£ aggravated
assault and attempted murder were based on separate conduct. In
her opening argument the prosecutor stated:
[Defendant has] been charged with three
crimes. He's been charged with aggravated
assault. And that's for pointing a gun at
[Franz's] head while they were parked behind
[the friend's] house. He's been charged with
attempted homicide. And that's for pointing
a gun at [Franz], pulling the trigger and
trying to kill her.
In closing, the prosecutor stated:
Going in chronological order . . . first of
all, [Defendant has been] charged with
aggravated assault. . . . And I submit to
you that when [Defendant] was at [the
friend's] house, he pointed a gun at [Franz]
. . . threatening her with a dangerous
weapon. That is an aggravated assault. The
attempted homicide, Count 1. And [Defendant]
took that gun and he pointed it at [Franz's]
(continued...)
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no evidence in the record that Defendant objected to the jury
instructions at trial or in his motion for a new trial. "[Rjule
19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that in
order to preserve an issue involving a jury instruction, the
objecting party must make an objection in the trial court,
'stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the around
of his objection.'" State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1227 (Utah
1998) (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)). "Accordingly, absent a
showing of manifest injustice, . . . [we will] refuse to review
jury instructions to which [a] party did not object in the trial
court . . . ." Id. Manifest injustice requires that the error
be "obvious" and "be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the
substantial rights of a party." Id. at 1226 (quotations and
citation omitted). Defendant does not argue on appeal that the
instructions meet either of these requirements. Therefore, his
lesser included offense argument fails.
CONCLUSION
^27 We conclude that the required mental state for attempted
murder under section 76-5-203(1) (a) is "intent or knowledge," and
therefore, the jury was appropriately instructed in the present
case. We also conclude that Defendant's aggravated assault and
attempted murder convictions were based on independent acts and
were separately proven at trial. Therefore, we affirm
Defendant's convictions.

• 8i4&»f4J
th M. Billings, Judge

CONCUR:

6.

. continued)
head in the car and he pulled the trigger.
[Defendant] attempted to kill . . . [Franz]
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